Letter to the editor,
followed by the original article
The Middle East should follow South
Africa's example
Jun 30, 2003
In response to Ms. Herzog article in the Globe and Mail, Tuesday
June 24th, 2003, paste bellow, I would like to point out to a confusion between
the real experience of South Africa example and the proposed peace plans in the
middle east.
The South Africa example is an example of serving justice
never been an example of compromise, this example is the best example in the
history, whish explain that the only steps toward standing peace through a real
rational negotiations. This negotiations led to a real peace, because it started
with the only logical step Justice whish
is the foundation of the building, that led to Reconciliation and
Normalization and
established real Peace which is the
only road to Security for everyone.
That
is how the apartheid
regime came to end and people was able to leave together when they abolish the white
superiority.
While the “Road map” and all other so called proposed peace
plans are not real because they try to build the building from the roof by
seeking security for the occupation while criminate the legitimate resistance,
those plans will never see the end of the tunnel because they only take into
consideration the present supper power and maintaining the upper hand for
Israel and its control over the all area.
Justice not been served since 1947, apartheid and inhuman is
going on for more than 55 years. Are we looking for real lasting peace or we
are buying time to be sure of the success of the Zionist plan.
Mohamed S. Kamel; ing.
www.apm-ram.com
The Mideast roadmap should follow South
Africa's lead
The first lesson is openness. A critical element in South Africa's transition process was the transparency of negotiations between the governing National Party and the African National Congress. White and black leaders realized that involving their own people was essential for negotiations to succeed. Even before the formal negotiating process, an extensive bottom-up process engaged broad sectors of the population and complemented the talks at the top-down leadership level.
Ultimately, the combination of determined leaders and informed constituencies made it possible to overcome the inevitable setbacks, and the result was impressive. Although 10,000 South Africans were killed between 1991-94, the negotiating process continued.
The critical role of public engagement has been overlooked all along in the Israeli-Palestinian equation. As early as the 1993 Oslo Accord, negotiators on both sides failed to appreciate the importance of legitimizing a deal within their own constituencies and didn't believe in transparency or inclusiveness. The Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority paid lip service at best to their commitment in the accord to encourage civil-society peace building. While formal peace talks continued, Palestinian media preached violence, and Israel restricted Palestinians' movements and expanded settlements. Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations that were committed to dialogue achieved some success in spite of the indifference or hostility of their respective governments.
South Africa offers a more pointed lesson for Israelis and Palestinians. Roelf Meyer, chief National Party negotiator, has written eloquently of the "personal paradigm shift" that paved the way for his successful negotiations with the ANC.
Mr. de Klerk's original goal was to make sufficient adjustments to the country's apartheid system to stabilize the country but without sacrificing continued special status for the white minority. According to Mr. Meyer, the real breakthrough in negotiations occurred only in 1992, when the South African leader understood that this old paradigm had to go. Once Mr. de Klerk realized that the Afrikaner minority's rights could best be protected in a democracy, even with majority black rule, his interests and those of the ANC converged in a new, common vision. (Both Mr. de Klerk and then ANC leader Nelson Mandela received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 for their roles in ending apartheid and introducing representative democracy.)
Israelis and Palestinians still cling to an old, win-lose paradigm, in which one side's gains are seen as the other's losses. As long as Israelis don't accept Palestinians as equal partners in a new, win-win paradigm based on a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel, negotiations will be undermined by suspicion and manipulation. Like Mr. de Klerk in 1990, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon knows that in the face of new international realities and demographic pressures, the greater risk is to take no risk.
Therefore, he acknowledges the need to change an intolerable status quo. But a negotiating strategy that discounts Palestinian needs and interests is likely to yield only limited success.
Palestinians have an additional challenge. In South Africa, the ANC's leadership recognized early on how essential it was to reassure white South Africans of their future position in a democratic South Africa. The ANC built legitimacy for the deal within its own ranks while actively calming the fears of Afrikaners about the workability and fairness of the new system. Most importantly, the ANC dealt decisively with violence and incitement, and assumed responsibility for its community's statements and actions.
The Palestinian Authority hasn't measured up to the ANC's test of leadership.
Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, it failed to legitimize the two-state approach among Palestinians. Mr. Arafat never told his people what they would have to give up for the sake of a deal, nor did he relinquish the option of violence. His equivocating rhetoric and tolerance for the terrorism of extremist factions convinced Israelis that he was unreliable and dishonest. Now, although Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas appears to have a clear vision for the future, he can no longer guarantee his community's co-operation. Because Mr. Abbas lacks legitimacy in the Palestinian street, he is unable to reassure Israelis that he can be a credible, committed partner.
While the conditions that helped South Africans in their transition are clearly missing in the Middle East, Mr. de Klerk can give Israelis and Palestinians one clear message: The two people are inextricably intertwined in this deep-rooted conflict. They can either continue to exacerbate their mutually destructive tendencies or identify a common vision and set out to surmount fear and mistrust.
Please read and feel free to forward, print, and publish.
We would like to apologize fro any repeated
messages, and any typing or grammatical errors.
We act because we believe in this quote: ”
You can fool some people some time, but you cannot fool all people all time”
Mohamed S. Kamel
internationalnews-owner@yahoogroups.com
www.apm-ram.com
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